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COMMENTS
USURY, INC. - INCORPORATION TO AVOID USURY LAWS
Where the real truth is a loan of money, the wit of man cannot
find a shift to take it out of the statute. - Lord Mansfield,
Floyer v. Edwards, 1 Cowp. 112 (1774).
THE STATUTE
"No corporation shall interpose the defense of usury in any action in
any court in this state." FLA. STAT. § 612.62 (1951). The statute is not
violative of the 14th amendment of the United States Constitution or the
equal protection clause' of the Florida Constitution.2 Similar enactments
expressly denying the defense of usury to corporations exist in many states
and have successfully withstood attacks upon their constitutionality.3
INTERPRETATION
Since the statute refers merely to a defense, and is silent as to any
positive action, there have been attempts to avoid its effect by bringing a
bill in equity to cancel the agreement,4 or by instituting suit to recover back
premiums.5 These have proven unsuccessful, since the statute has been
interpreted to mean any position or attitude by which the corporation seeks
to avoid its contract by showing it is usurious.6 The courts recognize that
a strict construction would defeat the beneficial aims of the Act7 and the
corporation should not be permitted to accomplish by indirection what it
cannot do directly.8 A clearly defined provision similar to that contained
within the modern Business Corporation Act of Oklahoma9 would elimi-
nate this unnecessary litigation. The provision in the aforementioned Act
is embodied in the Proposed Florida Business Corporation Act' 0 which was
introduced into the 1951 Legislature and is now in an interim committee.
1. FLA. CONST., Dec. of Rights § 1 (1951).
2. 759 Riverside Ave., Inc. v. Marvin, 109 Fla. 473, 147 So. 848 (1933).
3. Brierley v. Commercial Credit Co., 43 F.2d 724 (D. C. Pa. 1929), aff'd, 43
F.2d 730 (3rd Cir. 1930); State v. Huriburt, 82 Conn. 232, 72 Ati. 1079 (1909); Freese
v. Brownell, 35 N.I.L. 285, 10 Am. Rep. 239 (1871); Carozza v. Federal Finance &
Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 Ati. 332 (1925); Win. S. & John H. Thomas v. Union
Trust Co., 251 Mich. 279, 231 N.W. 619 (1930); Smoot v. People's Perpetual Loan
And Building Ass'n, 95 Va. 686, 29 S.E. 746 (1898). But see Gordon v. Winchester
Bldg. Ass'n, 12 Bush, 110, 23 Am. Rep. 713, 715 (Ky. 1876).
4. Isle of \,Vight Co. v. Smith, 51 lun, 562, 4 N.Y. Supp. 73 (1889).
5. Rosa v. Butterfield, 33 N.Y. 665 (1865).
6. Matlack Properties v, Citizens & Southern Nat. Bank, 120 Fla. 85, 162 So. 148(1935%: Supra, note 5.
8. Supra, note 4.
9. OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1.26 (Supp. 1949).
10. Prepared by the Fla. Corporation Code Revision Committee, Floyd A. Vright,
Chairman and Draftsman.
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PURPOSE
In order to appreciate fully the hypothetical problem to be presented,
it is necessary to discuss briefly the purpose of a usury law in comparison
with the purpose of the statute which denies the defense of usury to cor-
porations. "The prime purpose of the usury law is to protect needy bor-
rowers by penalizing unconscionable money lenders."" It is ". . . to bind
the power of creditors over necessitous debtors and prevent them from
extorting harsh and undue terms in the making of loans."' 2 The usury laws,
then, proceed upon the theory that the loan can be attributed to such an
inequality in the relation of the lender and borrower that the borrower's
necessities "deprived him of freedom in contracting and placed him at the
mercy of the lender." 13  On the other hand, the statute depriving a cor-
poration of the defense of usury proceeds upon the theory that corporations
do not borrow by necessity, but voluntarily, to enable them to carry forward
some enterprise which affords a reasonable expectation of profits sufficient
to repay the interest without loss or sacrifice."
Of prime consideration is the fact that the usury laws increase the
value of money and credit, and are restraints on the natural flow and supply
of capital to the prejudice of industry and commerce. 15
SCOPE
The statute with which we are here concerned is based upon plain and
practical considerations of public policy and this writer has no quarrel over
its enactment - it is the application of the statute that has provoked this
comment. The following hypothetical question presents a popular method
employed by money lenders to avoid the usury laws:
Mr. Borrower applies for a loan. Mr. Lender informs him that the
interest rate allowed in an individual loan is not satisfactory but, if Mr.
Borrower will incorporate, a loan can be arranged at an agreed rate of
interest. Mr. Borrower, subsequent to incorporation, conveys property to
the corporation in order to secure the loan. The note and mortgage are
executed by the corporation with Mr. Borrower as endorser, and the loan
is made at a rate of interest in excess of the amount legally allowed by
the usury laws. In a mortgage foreclosure proceeding the borrower defends
on the ground of usury. Upon a motion to strike the defense, who prevails?
APPLICATION
Unfortunately an answer to the preceeding hypothetical situation is
not readily ascertained inasmuch as the law in this regard is unsettled,
There have been few cases in which the precise point has been litigated.
None have been reported in Florida. The leading case is Jenkins v. Moyse,"'
11. Stubblefield v. Dunlap, 148 Fla. 401, 4 So.2d 519, 521 (1941).
12. Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146 So, 551, 552 (1933).
13. Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co., 149 Md. 223, 131 Ati. 332, 342 (1925).
14. Southern Life Ins. And Trust Co. v. Packer, 17 N.Y. 51 (1858).
15. Carozza v. Federal Finance & Credit Co, 149 Md. 223, 131 At]. 332 (1925).
16. 254 N.Y. 319, 172 N.E. 521 (1930).
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a New York Court of Appeals decision. In refusing to grant relief to the
borrower, the court "hung its hat" on the fact that the loan was refused
the individual - that the lender never agreed to make the loan to him.
The court said that there must be evidence that a loan to the individual
was agrccd upon and that the corporation was used to conceal an individual
transaction. The opinion in Jenkins v. Moyse did not close the door on a
usury defense in our hypothetical situation, but one must concede it left it
only slightly ajar. In effect, it depends on the way the lender approaches
the deal. 17 If, then, the lender agrees to make the loan to the individual,
and the corporation is used to conceal the usurious agreement, the motion
to strike the defense will be denied.'8 The lender, if he knows how, can
bring himself safely within the Jenkins v. Moyse rule. In First National
Bank of Brooklyn v. American Near East and Black Sea Line, 9 the court
stated, "The law is that, if there is notice of an intent to take usury, the
lender cannot evade the statute by disguising the borrower."20  This
decision was followed in Arona Holding Corp. v. West 25th St. Realty
Corp.2' These cases, decided in the lower courts of New York prior
to Jenkins v. Moyse, have not been expressly overruled. A recent decision
of that state granted the lender a summary judgment in a case where the
loan was also refused the individual, the court stating, "The law has not
been evaded but has been followed meticulously in order to accomplish a
result which all parties desired and which the law does not forbid."22
In a Maryland case,23 the court relied upon the decision in Jenkins v.
Moyse and estopped the borrower from denying the validity of the corpora-
tion. In that case too, the loan was refused the individual. Relief was
denied although the court recognized "that the primary and decisive con-
sideration was the avoidance of a conflict with the usury laws of the
state." 2
The problem has also been presented to the courts of New Jersey in
a foreclosure proceeding. The defense was raised that the loan was made in
fact to an individual, while in form to the corporation, and that the cor-
poration was not to engage in business or exercise any function whatsoever.
The court said that, having succeeded by false and fraudulent representation
in obtaining a certificate of incorporation, the corporation cannot now
benefit by this fraud and avoid its obligation.2 In a recent action at law
17. Sherling v. Gallatin Improvement Co., Inc., 145 Misc. 734, 260 N.Y. Supp. 229(1932), rev'd on other grounds, 237 App. Div. 535, 261 N.Y. Supp. 747 (1933), appeal
dismissed, 262 N.Y. 641, 188 N.E. 101 (1933).
18. Ibid.
19. 119 Misc. Rep. 650, 197 N.Y. Supp. 856 (1922).
20. Id at page 856.
21. 198 N.Y. Supp. 660 (1923).
22. Werger v. Hlaines Corp. 94 N.Y.S.2d 691, 692 (1950), aff'd, 277 App. Div.
1108, 101 N.YS.2d 361 (1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 930, 100 N.E.2d 189 (1951).
23. Rabinowich v. Eliasberg, 159 Md. 655, 152 Atl. 437 (1930).
24. Id at page 438.
25. Silberman v. Cades, 107 N.J. Eq. 547, 153 At]. 473 (1931).
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the court held that whether the loan was refused the individual or agreed
upon was an issuable question of fact for the jury to determine? 6 This
latter decision of the New Jersey court adopts the rule established in
Jenkins v. Moyse.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
It is apparent from the foregoing analysis that the lender can protect
himself by first refusing to make the loan to the individual and then suggest
that, if the borrower will incorporate, a loan will be made to the corpora-
tion. Should the lender agree to make the loan to the individual and then
impose the condition that the borrower incorporate, he may well find him-
self subject to the penalties provided by the usury laws. This hairline
distinction should not be recognized. The courts have repeatedly struck
down various devices employed to avoid the usury laws 7  The Supreme
Court of Florida has said, concerning the usury laws, ". . . we deem it to be
of paramount importance that a statute so salutary in its operation as is the
statute against usury, should be sedulously guarded against the ingenious
shifts and devices so often resorted to to evade its operation."28  To frus-
trate evasions, the courts look beyond the form of transactions to their
substance.2 They will not, however, by "piercing the corporate veil," defeat
the purpose of the statute depriving the corporation of the defense of usury.
However, they cannot escape the fact that blindly closing their eyes to
tainted transactions defeats the very letter and spirit of the usury laws. It
is inconceivable that the law itself has provided unscrupulous money lenders
with a device to successfully avoid the usury statutes. The needy borrower
is no less deprived of his freedom of contracting and is as much at the mercy
of the lender in this instance as in any other. XVhen the problem presents
itself to the courts the transaction should be closely scrutinized. If the
court finds that the loan was to the corporation in form only while in fact
it was to an individual, then it should make no difference in the way the
lender approached the deal. The transaction should be considered as just
another shift or device to avoid the usury statutes and be dealt with accord-
ingly. Reality, not appearance, should determine legal rights.
LEONARD M. RIViICND
COVENANTS FOR TITLE - PROTECTION AFFORDED
BUYER OF REALTY IN FLORIDA
The "Covenants for Title", sometimes referred to as the "Common
Law Covenants for Title", are six in number. They are: 1) The covenant
26. Celber v. Kugel's Tavern, Inc., 10 N.J. 191, 89 A.2d 654 (1952)
27. See Evasion and Avoidance of Florida Usury Laws, Comment, 5 M,^Ami LQ.
493 (1951).
28. Belden v. Cray, 5 Fla. 504, 508 (1854).
29. Beachan v. Carr, 166 So. 456 (Fla. 1936). But see Kings Meichantile Co. v.Cooper, 199 Misc. 381; 100 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756 (1950).
